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RICHARD BALDWIN
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Geneva
Europe’s reaction to the challenge of globalisation
Think of globalisation as unbundling, two unbundl-
ings in fact. Since the rise of human civilisation, eco-
nomic production and economic consumption have
tended to be clustered geographically to avoid the
cost of moving goods. For example, in the 1970s, we
could speak of ‘national systems’ of industrial com-
petition. German technology and German manage-
ment was bundled with German capital, and skilled
and unskilled German labour to produce German
goods,most of which were consumed in Germany.As
transportation costs fell, the first unbundling occurr-
ed. The market for industrial goods became global
and this eroded the tendency for goods to be made
close to the point of consumption. European indus-
try became increasingly internationalised; some sec-
tors, such as clothes and shoes, lost out to import
competition, but other sectors, such as pharmaceuti-
cals and telecoms won new export sales.This engen-
dered an important reallocation of European labour.
Some sectors, especially labour-intensive manufac-
turing sectors shed labour. Other sectors, especially
services and export-oriented manufacturing sectors
hired more workers. This might be called the first
unbundling – the geographic separation of produc-
tion and consumption.
More recently, Europe has seen a second unbundl-
ing.This unbundling involves the termination of the
tendency to group all manufacturing tasks geo-
graphically, for example all in one factory. This sec-
ond unbundling, which has variously been called
fragmentation, offshoring, vertical specialisation
and slicing up the value-added chain, shares many
similarities with the first unbundling,but it differs in
many important ways. In particular, it means that
the winners and losers from future globalisation
may differ from those in the past. In the past, one
could speak of winning and losing sectors – the pro-
duction of simple cotton clothes was a losing sector,
while the production of wide-bodied commercial
aircraft was a winner. Every worker in the cotton t-
shirt industry had to find a new job. The second
unbundling, however, does not affect sectors. It
affects tasks regardless of the sector. The linchpin
difference between the two unbundlings lies in the
nature of the trade cost change. In the first
unbundling, the most important change was in the
cost of trading goods – the nature of the change
affected all manufacturing sectors in a similar man-
ner. This is why Europe’s more competitive sectors
won and its least competitive sectors lost.In the sec-
ond unbundling, the key change is the drop in the
cost of “transporting” ideas, but this does not affect
all tasks.Not all tasks can be sent down a fibre optic
cable. For example, the rapid fall in telecommunica-
tion costs has made it profitable to offshore data-
entry tasks to low-wage nations such as India. This
became true for data-entry in the German car indus-
try but also for the German ship-building sector –
what matters is the nature of the task,not the sector
in which the task is done. By contrast, cheap tele-
phone calls and high-speed internet access has done
nothing to encourage the offshoring of truck drivers
regardless of whether they are working for Nokia or
Leyland Motors. More specifically, the second
unbundling seems to be affecting tasks that are eas-
ily codified and transmitted electronically. These
tasks used to be non-traded so the rewards to work-
ers performing these tasks were not linked to the
global market – they were set in local markets.This
meant that the North-South wage gap in these tasks
could greatly exceed the North-South productivity
gap (just as was true in the manufacturing sector
before the cost of trading goods fell).As these tasks
become increasing tradable, i.e. offshore-able, the
wage gap will have to shrink and/or the jobs will dis-
appear from Europe.
This alters the identity of the winners and losers
from future globalisation. From about 1970 to the
mid-1990s, the losers from globalisation were, gener-
ally speaking, low-skilled workers while highly edu-
cated workers tended to win.Going forward,howev-
er, the split may fall not between high- and low-
skilled workers, but rather between workers
involved in tasks that switch from non-traded to
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for example the task of loading boxes into trucks,
will not be affected by the second unbundling, while
others, for example phone operators, will. At the
other end, some high-skilled jobs, for example the
analysis of MRI medical scans can be offshored,
while other high-skilled jobs,for example investment
banking, cannot since it does not involve a service
that can be sent down a fibre optic cable.
The first unbundling has proceeded at a remarkable
pace with foreign markets opening up on both the
supply and demand side (the key markets being the
former Soviet-bloc nations, China and India). For
Europeans, these openings created opportunities for
both extra sales and for further optimisation of pro-
duction structures.The second unbundling has come
more recently and indeed has not, to date, involved
much in the way of job loss or job creation. In these
short comments, the first sections consider these
opportunities in turn. The subsequent section con-
siders how Europe has risen to the challenges creat-
ed by these new opportunities.
Opportunity #1: Access to new markets 
On the sales side, the opening of Central Europe,
China and India has not had a transformational
impact on Europe’s pattern of exports. It is true that
sales to these markets have risen quickly,but the dif-
ferences are not so great as commonly portrayed in
popular debate. The point is made in which shows
the share of EU15 exports going to various regions
in the world. From 1980 till the present, the lion’s
share of West European exports have gone to other
rich nations, mainly other West European countries
and North America. Since 1990, there has been a
decline in the share of exports to ‘industrial nations’,
but this has been quite modest. The rising shares
have been in Central and Eastern Europe including
Russia,and Asia,although Asia’s share contracted in
the aftermath of the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis and is
now recovering.
Future income and trade patterns
Although the shift in sales patterns has been modest
to date, a few facts and a bit of reasoning suggests
that going forward, Europe is likely to see a much
more important shift in its export pattern. We start
with the Central and Eastern European nations.The
ten Central and Eastern European nations that are
or soon will be members of the EU are very small
economically. In 2004, the sum of their incomes
(GDP) was only about 5 percent of EU27 total.Here
incomes are measured in euros and not adjusted for
local price differences so that they reflect the true
purchasing power of these nations when it comes to
importing goods from Western Europe. The ten
nations’ population, by contrast, amounts to about
20 percent of the EU27 total.Since most of the new-
comers are growing two or three times as fast as the
EU15 nations, the next decades should see the new-
comers’ market rising in importance as a destination
for Western Europe’s exports.
The mismatch between population and income is
much more marked for India and China, as shows.
The chart plots the world share of GDP and popula-
tion for various regions and nations. The left bar
shows the shares of world population. India and
China account for 38 percent of the world’s popula-
tion,but only 6 percent of world income.For the EU,
US and Japan the imbalance is
just the other way around; they
account for 70 percent of world
income but only 13 percent of
world population.
If Indian and Chinese incomes
continue to expand at the
growth rates observed over the
past decade, the two sets of bars
will look a great deal more like
each other.From the perspective
of European exporters this
means that China and India are
likely to be major sources of
growth in future years.





















Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2004.
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Adjustment to new market opportunities
Market opening creates new opportunities. Exploit-
ing these opportunities requires nations to adjust.
Adjustment is hard in the real world and this is why
globalisation is a topic of concern. Adjustment, in
short, is the real topic of this conference. From this
perspective it is useful to classify this adjustment into
two broad categories:
#1 – Cross-sector specialisation, e.g. expanding the
transport equipment sector while shrinking the
clothing sector.
#2 – Within-sector specialisation and scale econo-
mies,e.g.firms focus on few products and lower costs
by raising scale economies.
The first type is typically predominant when the
market opening occurs among rich nations that have
similar wage structures.The second type tends to be
dominant when the integration is between nations
with very different income levels and very different
wage profiles.
Under both types of adjustment, there are winners
and losers. Although the winners win more than the
losers lose, the heart of the adjustment question is
what the losers lose. The two types of adjustments,
however, imply very different ratios of winners and
losers. Under the second type, some sectors have to
downsize and other sectors have to expand. This will
require workers to switch jobs,maybe even move to a
new city. Under the first type of adjustment, changes
more typically involve a reorganisation within the
sector, sometimes even within individual firms.
In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, most of the market
opening was among rich nations and so involved
adjustment of type #2. This was
not easy politically, but com-
pared to recent experience it
was a walk in the park. In the
1990s and new century period,
most of the market opening has
been between rich and poor
nations. Much of the adjustment
of has been of the #1 type and so
very difficult politically.
Low wage, low productivity
The new markets that have
opened in to last couple of de-
cades – the former Soviet bloc nations (especially
the Central Europeans), China and India – involve
nations that are very different from those in Western
Europe, at least in terms of per capita income and
profile of the labour force. These nations are
endowed with a relative abundance of low-produc-
tivity, low-wage labour.The point can be seen clear-
ly in . GDP/population is a measure of output per
person and income per person since, apart from a
few unusual cases, a nation’s income equals its out-
put (the unusual cases involve nations that have a
significant share of their labour or capital working
abroad). From the table we see that average output
per person in the ten Central and Eastern European
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Source: Eurostat online database.
EU15 UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, 2005
%
Figure 2
GDP per person, Central & Eastern Europe, and Russia  












EU15 32,765  376.7 
CE10 7,106  95.9  Mexico 6,586 
Russia 4,021 146.9  Argentina 4,060 
Ukraine 1,303  49.9  Angola 1,309 
China 1,486  1.30 
India 623  1.07 
Notes: CE10 stands for Central Europe 10 (3 Baltic States, 4 Central European 
States (where central refers to north-south rather than east-west) and Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovenia. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook online database. nations is on par with Mexico,while Russia’s average
output per person is at the level of Argentina;
Ukraine’s is close to Angola’s. The differences are
even more pronounced when looking at India and
China.
One point that I would like to stress is the connec-
tion between output per hour and wages.As a mat-
ter of basic economic definitions, a very low GDP is
an indication of very low labour productivity.It may
sound harsh, but it is a simple economic fact that
poor nations are poor because they do not produce
very much per worker. Why this output per hour is
low is a complex question.But it is almost surely not
a matter of personal attributes but rather a lack of
training, poor economic and societal infrastructure,
etc.The way the market keeps these low productiv-
ity workers employed is by lowering the wage to
match the productivity. A key surely is that this
wage adjustment can result in a uneven competi-
tiveness of poor nation workers. For example,
Chinese managers are not very productive com-
pared to their wages,while manual workers in China
have very low unit labour costs despite the fact that
their wages are much higher than those in places
like Bangladesh. The Table thus tells us that the
newly open European markets will tend to have an
edge in goods whose production is relatively inten-
sive in low-productivity/low-wage labour.As a con-
sequence,this opening will tend to foster adjustment
of type #1.
Opportunity #2: Access to cheaper, eager,
well-educated labour forces
The second opportunity that arises from the opening
of markets entails international re-optimisation of
production. I like to think of this as the second un-
bundling, although others have called it fragmenta-
tion, slicing up the value-added chain, and interna-
tional production networks. To explain unbundling,
consider first bundling.In the old days,say the 1970s,
we could speak of ‘national systems’ of industrial
competition. Taking Germany as an example, Ger-
man technology and German management was bun-
dled with German capital, and skilled and unskilled
labour. This bundle competed with other nations’
bundles of technology, management, capital and
labour.
As often happens when things are bundled and sold
as one, the bundling tended to overvalue some ele-
ments and undervalue others. In general, the pro-
ductive factors that were relatively abundant in
Germany tended to be undervalued, while the rela-
tively scarce factors got overvalued. In Germany’s
case that meant that managers and technology were
remunerated at below their true value in the world
market and German labour got wages above their
values.
When the cost of moving goods,people and ideas fell
rapidly, the production bundle got undone. This
unbundling meant that German managers could
organise production of Polish workers using Polish
capital and German technology. Or, German tech-
nology – embodied in German capital goods – could
be used by Chinese managers employing Chinese
capital and labour.
This unbundling changed the relative scarcity of the
various productive factors in all nations,but here we
are especially concerned with what happened in
Europe. Before turning to the implications of this
unbundling, it is worth noting that the cost of mov-
ing people, goods and ideas did not fall in propor-
tion. The cost of moving people, in particular, did
not fall anywhere near as much as the cost of mov-
ing goods.The basic reason is that although the price
of plane tickets fell, the main cost – the time cost of
moving people – continued to rise. For example, if a
technician takes two half-days for travel per week,
his company will have to hire a fifth more techni-
cians to get the same job done that could have been
done if the work came to the technicians rather than
the technicians to the work. The cost of moving
goods fell by more but since oceanic shipping was
containerised decades ago, the main evolution has
been a big drop in the price of shipping goods by air.
Finally, and most dramatically, the cost of shipping
ideas – here I am talking about telecommunications
of all forms – has experienced a revolutionary
reduction. It is easy to cite examples involving the
internet,but I think the example that hits home best
with modern managers concerns telephone calls.
Just two decades ago a ‘long distance’ call was some-
thing important,especially if it was trans-Atlantic or
even further. Long distance calls had to be booked,
managed and kept short. Today, I see managers
often making a few calls in the time its takes them to
get off the plane and into the air terminal; judging
from the languages, many of this are long distance
and judging from the side of the conversation I can
hear, they most definitely are not booked, managed
or kept short!
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The different drops in the cost of ‘trading’ people’s
time, goods and ideas goes a long way to explaining
the particular pattern of unbundling that we have
seen. In both Europe and East Asia, complex supply
networks have been set up where a good (or its var-
ious parts and components) crosses international
borders several times before finally being shipped to
customers. That is, goods are doing a lot more mov-
ing than people. Moreover, ideas are doing even
more moving and this has made it conceivable to
organise and manage complex cross-nation produc-
tion networks.
Again taking Germany as an example,we can think
of the ‘old days’ situation as one where the rela-
tively abundant factors (relative to world supplies
that is) were ‘exploited’ by the relatively scarce fac-
tors. For example, in the 1970s, automobile technol-
ogy was relatively abundant in Germany compared
to the world at large and German factory labour
was relatively scarce by world standards. Since the
only way to exploit German auto technology on the
world market was to combine it with German
labour, German technology tended to earn less
than it would have and German factory labour
tended to earn more than it would have. When
improvements in telecommunications and shipping
(especially air transportation) made it feasible to
produce some automobile parts abroad, the
demand for German technology and management
rose while the demand (from the auto sector) for
German factory labour fell.
Challenge #1: Reallocating productive factors in the
face of rigid labour markets
Globalisation provides nations with new opportuni-
ties. The economies of well governed nations can
seize these new opportunities to improve the well-
being of citizens.As already mentioned, new oppor-
tunities of almost any type create winners and losers.
To put it starkly, each job that is offshored is an
opportunity for Europe to allocate its labour more
efficiently. To think this through, consider why the
job was offshored in the first place. The job is off-
shored because the European worker’s productivity
edge over his or her replacement in, say, India, does
not justify the Europe/India wage gap. This is not
true for all jobs. The same cannot be said of, for
example, German auto workers. German auto work-
ers earn far more than Malaysian auto workers, but
they are also far more productive. Indeed, if it were
not for Malaysian trade barriers against cars,
German-made cars would be extremely competitive
in the Malaysian market. In short, the German-
Malaysian productivity gap more than compensates
for the German-Malaysian wage gap in the automo-
bile industry. Since the productivity gap does not
compensate for the wage gap in offshored jobs, it
stands to reason that labour will be more efficient
when it is reallocated to another task.
It is exactly this reallocation that causes all the prob-
lems. One colloquial way of putting it, is to say that
job offshoring is good for society as a whole,but you
would not want your sons and daughters to find
themselves performing tasks that were to be off-
shored. This is where government comes in. Good
governance is required to ensure that society as a
whole supports the changes that are necessary to
exploit the new opportunities. In some sense, good
government is like a pre-signed contract that ensures
most members of society that the pains and the gains
of the changes will be shared. Since all know about
the sharing,the nation can muster a political consen-
sus to embrace the new opportunities.
One approach to these challenges is the one adopted
by US society. There, a majority of citizens firmly
believe that the basic notion should be sauve-qui-
peut, i.e. that it is the individual’s duty to adjust to
changes so the government largely leaves individual
workers to their own devices. European societies do
not accept this approach and so have implemented
the so-called social market economy. This entails
massive programmes that insure all workers against
adverse developments – whatever the cause (global-
isation, aging of the population, technological
change, etc.). These programmes come in many
forms.The basic pillar is income support that ensures
a minimum living standard for all members of soci-
ety regardless of their employment status and earn-
ings.But in some European nations,the state’s inter-
vention into the economy is far more extensive,
including active re-training programmes, state-paid
education and the subsidisation of specific economic
enterprises.
When it comes to the challenge of reallocating
labour to take advantage of the opportunities posed
by globalisation, it is important to distinguish
between two types of income insurance – employ-
ment protection legislation (i.e. laws that make it
hard to fire workers) and employment insurance
(programmes that replace part of a worker’s earn-
Panel 2ings when he/she loses his/her job). In a nutshell,
employment protection laws tend to hinder adjust-
ment while employment insurance tends to foster
adjustment.Another important element in a nation’s
ability to reallocate labour is its labour market insti-
tutions. In nations where labour market institutions
are either very loose or very centralised,adjustments
can occur easily. In the unstructured labour markets,
say Britain’s, workers and firms come to terms with
each other. In nations with highly centralised labour
markets,like Sweden,everyone feels responsible and
it may be possible to agree on major changes. The
nations with in-between labour markets, such as
France and Germany, find it much harder to make
adjustments.
The results of these different policies can be seen in
the widely varying unemployment rates in the EU15
shown in . While European unemployment is high
overall – over 8 percent for the EU15 – several Eu-
ropean nations have unemployment rates that are
below that of the United States, namely Britain, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg.
Indeed, the high European unemployment stems
from Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, but even
among these, the performance over time has varied
enormously. For example, Spain’s unemployment
rate has fallen from over 20 percent in the 1990s to
under 10 percent today. Germany’s unemployment
rate in contrast is up from its low pre-reunification
level, and shows sharp regional differences between
the West and the East.
As Blanchard (2005) argues,the high unemployment
rates reflect a failure of the labour market to encour-
age the reallocation of labour between sectors. To
see this, note that Europe’s labour market is a very
dynamic place, there is a great deal of hiring and fir-
ing of workers. 1.5 percent of all jobs are destroyed
in France each month and roughly as many are cre-
ated.This is about the same as in the United States.
Moreover, workers leave jobs even when the job is
not destroyed;about 4 percent of workers leave their
jobs per month as demonstrated by Cahuc and
Zylberberg (2004). Given this high job turnover, the
process of matching workers and jobs becomes criti-
cal. In Europe, especially in the large Continental
nations, government policies and labour market
institutions have slowed down the process. Workers
and firms are taking their time to find matches. In
European nations with better run labour markets,
the matches happen faster, so workers spend less
time on the dole between jobs.The result is a lower
unemployment rate.
Concluding remarks
This short discussion of a complex topic ends with
two observations on policy changes.The first is in no
way novel, the second somewhat more so.
European societies do not accept the US model
where individuals bear the brunt of both the pains
and the gains of globalisation. European voters con-
sistently reject politicians who push the US model of
market economics.In short,European voters are will-
ing to pay for the social harmony that comes with the
social market model. While this holds true straight
across Europe, the burden of sharing the pains and
gains is quite different. In some European nations,
institutions and policies have resulted in over 10 per-
cent of the workforce on the dole.This implies a high
cost to taxpayers in terms of
transfers, but it also means an
important loss in national pro-
duction. In Denmark and Hol-
land, voters also vote for social
policies but they have arranged
the labour market in a way that
reduces the pure waste of having
so many workers idle. The chal-
lenge for politicians in Italy,
France and Germany is to con-
vince their voters that there is no
contradiction between caring and
reforming labour markets in a
way that gets people back to
work more quickly.
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The second comment concerns European govern-
ments’ reaction to the second unbundling. Much of
Europe is embarked on the Lisbon agenda that is
supposed to push Europe towards the information
society. While this sounds like a good idea from the
perspective of the first unbundling – after all it seems
to be pushing Europe’s resources towards the ‘win-
ning’ sectors – it may be less of a good idea in the
face of the second unbundling. Many of the jobs in
the information society are today non-traded and
thus may seem like good jobs, safe jobs. But many of
these jobs involve services that can be sent down a
fibre optic cable and thus are subject to new compe-
tition from abroad. Of course, this new opening due
to lower costs of trading ideas constitutes an oppor-
tunity for Europe as a whole, but seizing the oppor-
tunity will require a reallocation of labour. Thus it
might not be prudent to embark on large projects to
train European workers to do jobs whose existence
is likely to be temporary.More generally,one can say
that the impact of the second unbundling is far less
predictable than that of the first unbundling. The
simple reason is that no one really understands what
sort of jobs can be or will be offshored. The lesson
stemming from this suggests that Europe might want
to focus its education and training on encouraging
workers to acquire skills that make them more flexi-
ble and able to learn new tasks.Moreover,it is not at
all clear that more education is a way of ensuring
that a larger fraction of the workforce is in the win-
ners’ category. The second unbundling seems to be
especially prevalent in office jobs, many of which
now require higher education.
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PANEL
In addition to the above speakers, the panel, which
was chaired by Michael Ackermans, Editor-in-Chief
of the Dutch weekly, FEM Business, consisted of
four business representatives:
Anton Kathrein is Managing Partner and Owner of
Kathrein-Werke KG, the largest producer of anten-
na system technology, worldwide. He explained how
his German-based company has managed to remain
an industry leader with world-wide distribution and
a high investment rate in R&D. Kathrein had ties to
Eastern Europe before the fall of the Iron Curtain
and now produces in Romania and the Czech
Republic, where it has achieved the same product
quality standards as in Germany. Currently, his com-
pany’s R&D is all in Germany, but some of this will
also eventually go offshore.
Kulpreet Singh is an Indian national working as gen-
eral manager of the UK and Europe Division of the
US corporation, EXL Services, an outsourcing spe-
cialist in the banking, financial services and insur-
ance sector. He described his task which is to create
more value for companies by helping them rediscov-
er what initially made them successful and to exam-
ine what functions need to be outsourced or off-
shored. He maintained that companies that properly
assess the risks and rewards of outsourcing stand to
benefit from more value creation.
Klaus J. Jacobs is Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Adecco SA, an international human re-
sources services company based in Switzerland. He
made the following suggestions for keeping Euro-
pe’s industry competitive: 1) manage the transition
from school to work to prevent young people from
falling into unemployment; 2) encourage life-long
learning involving an investment of at least two
weeks a year in competence building programmes;
3) initiate programmes for elite interdisciplinary
education at the universities to retain Europe’s best
brains for know-how development and research;and
4) introduce compensation programmes to increase
commitment to longer work.
Lars Pettersson is President and Chief Executive
Officer of Sandvik AB, a Swedish high-tech engi-
neering group with business activities in 130 coun-
tries. Ninety-eight percent of his company’s sales is
outside Sweden.The growth of Sandvik is also much
faster outside than inside Europe. He maintained
that Europe’s productivity is too low, its educational
system needs improving and its immigrants must be
better integrated. “We must face the fact that
Europe is the laggard and try to understand why.The
longer we wait,the bigger the problem will become,”
he emphasised.
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